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CONTRACTING AWAY THE FIRST AMENDMENT?:




Donald Trump, Harvey Weinstein, the Catholic Church—what do the three have
in common? All are powerful actors in the public eye. And all three have signed
nondisclosure agreements that trade money for silence: contracts that pay individuals
not to spread information that would likely severely damage these actors’ reputa-
tions.1 If a law required individuals to stay silent or incur large financial penalties,
such a law would clearly violate the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. But
because these nondisclosure agreements are private contracts—willingly and volun-
tarily entered into by all parties—the State is not involved and thus the First Amend-
ment plays no role, right?
Not necessarily. This Note will argue that courts need to intervene in private
nondisclosure agreements to protect First Amendment rights.2 Specifically, courts
should require public officials and certain public figures to prove actual malice before
they can recover for breach of a nondisclosure agreement formed solely to protect
the individual’s reputation from the consequences of his or her own bad conduct.
While court intervention in nondisclosure agreements may initially appear to be a
massive shake-up of existing contract law principles, this Note will show that the
actual malice test provides a reasonable and necessary way to protect free speech on
matters of public interest, while still accommodating privacy needs. This Note will
first discuss the Court’s prevailing approach to contract law3 and then explain why
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2020; BA, Bridgewater College, 2017.
Thank you to the Bill of Rights Journal staff for all their hard work editing my Note, and to
Professor James Josefson of Bridgewater College for always encouraging me to think critically.
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1 See Jeannie Suk Gersen, Trump’s Affairs and the Future of the Nondisclosure Agreement,
NEW YORKER (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trumps-affairs
-and-the-future-of-the-nondisclosure-agreement [https://perma.cc/F4L6-GNVD]; James Rufus
Koren, Weinstein Scandal Puts Nondisclosure Agreements in the Spotlight, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23,
2017, 11:13 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-weinstein-nondisclosure-agreements
-20171023-story.html [https://perma.cc/U5GZ-GCRJ].
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 See discussion infra Part I.
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a change in favor of court intervention is warranted.4 Next, this Note will lay out the
proposed intervention test.5 Finally, it will address potential criticisms to the test.6
I. BACKGROUND: THE SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT APPROACH TO CONTRACT LAW
A. The Court’s General Approach: “Hands-Off”
The Court’s current approach to contract law7 is perhaps best described as
“hands-off.” The Court seeks to intervene in private contracts as little as possible,
preferring to allow parties to be governed by their own agreements, as long as certain
basic conditions are met.8 For example, the Court assumes a “presumption of contract
validity”—as long as there was mutual assent and consideration during formation
of the contract, the Court “will presume that a valid contract exists.”9 This presump-
tion of validity illustrates the modern policy of allowing private parties to have
substantial latitude to enter into and make the terms of their private agreements10—
as long as parties enter into the agreement voluntarily,11 courts will enforce those
agreements “regardless of the legal excuse advanced.”12 Even “parties who do not
consciously consent to be subject to contractual duties nevertheless are bound so
long as their conduct reasonably manifests assent.”13 For example, courts regularly
enforce even those contracts that require parties to waive their constitutional rights, as
long as the parties waived those rights “voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.”14
B. The Court’s Approach to Nondisclosure Agreements
Like the Court’s approach to contract law generally, its approach to nondisclosure
agreements specifically is hands-off, favoring a presumption of validity even when
4 See discussion infra Part II.
5 See discussion infra Part II.
6 See discussion infra Section II.C.2.
7 See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
431, 527–28 (1993).
8 See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. BALT.
L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2011); Shell, supra note 7, at 527.
9 Hart, supra note 8, at 16.
10 See Shell, supra note 7, at 527.
11 See Hart, supra note 8, at 14.
12 Id. at 18.
13 Shell, supra note 7, at 440.
14 D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (holding that when a com-
pany signed a promissory note containing a cognovit provision, that signature implied that
the company had “voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly” waived its due process right to
notice); Wayne Klomp, Note, Harmonizing the Law in Waiver of Fundamental Rights: Jury
Waiver Provisions in Contracts, 6 NEV. L.J. 545, 561 (2005).
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constitutional rights are at stake.15 The Court demonstrated its approach to nondisclo-
sure agreements in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.16 Dan Cohen worked on a guberna-
torial campaign and approached reporters from the Pioneer Press and Star Tribune,
offering to give them documents related to that campaign.17 However, he would give
the documents only on the condition that his identity remain confidential.18 The
reporters promised to keep Cohen’s name anonymous, and he turned over the docu-
ments.19 When the reporters published their stories, they disclosed Cohen as the
source of the documents, and Cohen was subsequently fired from his position on the
campaign.20 Cohen sued the reporters for breach of contract.21
The Court noted that judicial enforcement of a confidentiality agreement con-
stituted state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus triggered
the protections of the First Amendment.22 Nonetheless, the Court held that because
Minnesota’s promissory estoppel law was a “law of general applicability”—the law
did “not target or single out the press”—the confidentiality agreement was enforce-
able despite its effect on the reporters’ ability to speak.23 In accordance with the Court’s
general view that parties ought to have substantial latitude to determine the terms
of their own agreements, the Court stressed that here, any restrictions on the reporters’
speech were “self-imposed,”24 affirming the Court’s hands-off approach to nondis-
closure agreements.
C. The Justifications Behind the Court’s Current “Hands-Off” Approach
The Court’s hands-off approach to contracts reflects concern for a number of
interests. First, the Court’s approach reflects a “freedom of contract” policy25—namely,
that citizens in a free society should be able to freely enter into agreements of their
choosing, generally unfettered by court interference.26 Second, the hands-off approach
to contract law belies an interest in the efficient administration of the judicial system.27
15 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670–71 (1991); Shell, supra note 7,
at 527.
16 Cohen, 501 U.S. 663.
17 Id. at 665.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 666.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 668.
23 Id. at 670.
24 Id. at 671.
25 See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U. L.
REV. 263, 282–83, 282 n.76 (1999) (defining “freedom of contract” and a “right of exchange,”
free from “interference from others,” according to English social commentator Herbert Spencer).
26 Id. at 282–83.
27 See Shell, supra note 7, at 438.
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Transaction costs would arise from closer judicial scrutiny of contracts—parties
would bring more cases and those cases would take longer to resolve.28
A hands-off approach to nondisclosure agreements in particular serves several
important interests as well. First, allowing parties to freely enter into nondisclosure
agreements allows those parties to protect their privacy interests.29 For example,
women who faced sexual harassment while employed by a company may enter into
a nondisclosure agreement with the company to ensure that the company remains
silent.30 Thus, the nondisclosure agreement empowers the woman to determine
whether, and with whom, she will share this sensitive information, rather than leaving
her at the mercy of her employer.31 Furthermore, allowing parties to protect their
privacy can actually protect important speech.32 A robust nondisclosure agreement
facilitates free exchange between the parties, thus encouraging speech that might
otherwise be chilled by concerns about disclosure.33
Second, a hands-off approach to nondisclosure agreements protects economic in-
terests vital to today’s business world.34 Businesses are free to enter into binding non-
disclosure agreements that penalize employees who leak trade secrets.35 Because
“U.S. businesses lose at least $24 billion a year because of stolen trade secrets, most
of it from the sale of secrets by employees to competitors,” allowing parties to freely
enter into nondisclosure agreements gives businesses an important tool to counter the
threat of trade secret disclosure.36 Nondisclosure agreements also enable businesses and
individuals to prevent employees from disparaging their employers, thus protecting the
business’s or individual’s reputation.37 Reputational protection might not be possible
if courts intervened in nondisclosure agreements that prohibit disparaging speech.38
While several important interests are served by a hands-off approach to non-
disclosure agreements, ultimately this Note will argue that, in some cases, courts
should intervene in nondisclosure agreements. This Note will explain why the Court
should intervene in such nondisclosure agreements despite the interests protected by
28 See id.
29 See Shira A. Scheindlin & Rosalind Fink, Bar NDAs? Not So Fast Please!, N.Y. L.J.




31 See, e.g., id.
32 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532–33 (2001).
33 See id.
34 See RICHARD STIM & STEPHEN FISHMAN, NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS: PROTECT
YOUR TRADE SECRETS & MORE 1 (Mary Randolph ed., 2001).
35 See id. at 1–2.
36 Id. at 1.
37 See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 272 (1998).
38 See id. at 274–75.
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a hands-off approach.39 Furthermore, it will explain how the Court can intervene to
prevent abuses of speech rights while still protecting freedom of contract, judicial
efficiency, privacy, and economic interests.40
II. ARGUMENT: WHY AND HOW THE COURT SHOULD INTERVENE IN
NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS TO PROTECT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Why Should the Court Intervene?
1. The Court’s Interventions in Other Areas of Private Law Demonstrate that the
Court’s “Hands-Off” Approach to Contracts Does Not Make Sense
Despite the Court’s current hands-off contract law policy, it has, at times, in-
tervened in private agreements to protect constitutional rights.41 The Court justifies
that intervention on the grounds that court enforcement would constitute state action
in contravention of the Constitution.42 For example, in Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court
refused to enforce a restrictive covenant on the grounds that the agreement violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 In that case, several
white property owners had entered into an agreement preventing them from selling
their land to African Americans.44 When one property owner sold his land to an
African-American family, other parties to the agreement brought suit to enforce the
restrictive covenant and divest the family of title.45
The Court held that judicial enforcement of the agreement would constitute state
action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 But for the enforcement of the
state, through the Court, the agreement would have no legal effect: only court action
could enforce the agreement and force the African-American family to vacate its
home.47 Therefore, court enforcement was, in effect, state implementation of a dis-
criminatory law.48 Such state action is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.49
Shelley demonstrates that the Court is willing to intervene in private law to protect
constitutional rights when court enforcement of a private agreement constitutes state
action.50 However, court enforcement of a private agreement is always state action,
39 See discussion infra Section II.A.
40 See discussion infra Section II.B.
41 See Cody J. Jacobs, The Second Amendment and Private Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 945,
948 (2017).
42 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1948).
43 Id. at 20.
44 Id. at 4–5.
45 Id. at 6.
46 Id. at 20.
47 Id. at 19–20.
48 Id. at 20.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 19–20.
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regardless of whether the case involves property rights, as in Shelley, or speech rights,
as in a nondisclosure agreement.51 In private actions, “the level of state involvement is
always the same: the court is enforcing the common-law right of one private individual
against another. A court adjudicating a trespass claim that suppresses speech is . . . a
state actor just as much as one adjudicating a libel claim that suppresses speech.”52
In fact, the Court itself recognized in Shelley that court enforcement constitutes
state action regardless of the specifics or nature of the suit.53 Indeed, in Cohen, the
Court held that court enforcement of a nondisclosure agreement was state action
triggering constitutional protections, and yet it still allowed the newspaper to be
punished for breach of confidentiality.54 Therefore, the Court’s hands-off approach
to contracts cannot be justified by the fact that contracts are private agreements,
because whenever there is court enforcement, there is state action, regardless of
whether the court enforces a private agreement or a state law.55 The test for whether
or not to intervene in private action, including nondisclosure agreements, therefore
cannot be whether the court is acting as a state actor.
Neither can the intervention test be the Cohen majority’s “generally applicable
laws” test.56 Recall that the Cohen majority held that because Minnesota’s promis-
sory estoppel law was “generally applicable,” the confidentiality agreement bound
the reporters despite its chilling effect on their speech.57 However, that holding
ignores the fact that the Court has intervened in private law cases even though those
cases involved generally applicable laws.58 The Cohen dissent explained this incon-
sistency with regard to the case of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.59 In Hustler, a promi-
nent minister sued the Magazine for intentional infliction of emotional distress.60
The Court intervened, altering the existing intentional infliction of emotional distress
legal standards because they raised free-speech concerns.61 As the Cohen dissent
noted, the Court intervened in Hustler even though:
there was no doubt that Virginia’s tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress was a “law of general applicability” unrelated
to the suppression of speech. Nonetheless, a unanimous Court
51 Jacobs, supra note 41, at 974.
52 Id.
53 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 17 (“But the examples of state judicial action which have been held
by this Court to violate the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s commands are not restricted to situa-
tions in which the judicial proceedings were found in some manner to be procedurally unfair.”).
54 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668–69 (1991).
55 See Jacobs, supra note 41, at 974.
56 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
57 Id.
58 See id. at 674–75.
59 485 U.S. 46 (1988); see Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674–76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 47–48.
61 Id. at 47–48, 56.
2019] CONTRACTING AWAY THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 547
found that, when used to penalize the expression of opinion, the
law was subject to the strictures of the First Amendment.62
2. Voluntary Versus Involuntary, Public Versus Private—What Is Really Going
On Here?
The dissent’s observation reveals that the real basis of the Cohen majority’s
decision was not the fact that a generally applicable law was involved.63 Instead, the
real foundation of the Court’s decision was its focus on contract as a consensual
relationship.64 For instance, the Court stated that “[t]he parties themselves . . .
determine the scope of their legal obligations, and any restrictions that may be
placed on the publication of truthful information are self-imposed.”65 Because the
confidentiality agreement was a voluntary contract, the reporters had consented to
give up their First Amendment rights.66 In other words, the Supreme Court essen-
tially held that courts should not intervene in contract cases.
Basing intervention decisions on the mere form of the cause of action, however,
does not provide any better a test than the “state action” or “generally applicable law”
tests. Such a test for intervention is overly formalistic, leading to false distinctions
between tort, contract, and property law as a basis for First Amendment interven-
tion.67 For example, in theory, tort and contract law are separate and distinct: “tort
duties . . . apply against the whole world, [while] contractual obligations extend only
to the parties to a transaction.”68 But in practice, “the realms of tort, contract, and
property are overlapping and indistinct. . . . [Thus] [c]urrent First Amendment theory
lacks a compelling justification for why we treat tort rules differently from those
sounding in property or contract.”69
Consider the example of a personal physician who discloses that the Chief Exec-
utive Officer (CEO) he treats has dementia and that it will compromise his ability
to run his company.70 The CEO could go the contract route and sue for breach of an
implied contract of confidentiality, or he could sue for a breach of confidentiality tort.71
The physician claims that the First Amendment bars liability.72 The Court has inter-
vened to protect First Amendment concerns in tort cases, but not contract cases.73
62 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 675 (citation omitted).
63 See id. at 675–76.
64 See id.
65 Id. at 671 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
66 See id.
67 See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1653 (2009).
68 Id. at 1666 (citation omitted).
69 Id. at 1653, 1656.
70 Id. at 1669.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See Jacobs, supra note 41, at 948.
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Thus, the case could result in a different outcome depending on which theory is used,
even though “the nature of the information involved is the same,” and “the basic
theory upon which liability is premised is also largely the same—an express or implied
assumption of a duty of confidentiality.”74 The similarity between the contract and
tort actions in these examples demonstrates that the Court’s distinctive approaches
to the two actions are based on mere formalism, not any real, important differences.
Furthermore, the voluntary nature of contracts does not provide sufficient
justification for the distinction between the Court’s approaches to tort and contract.
Gary Peller’s article explains how voluntary versus involuntary characterizations of
contract and tort duties are constructed, not necessarily reality.75 “The modern
understanding is that the categories of public and private [in other words, tort duties
and contract duties] . . . constitute a continuum.”76 In short, the line between what
is public and private, voluntary duty and imposed duty, is blurry.77 Yet contract and
tort duties are described as black-and-white: They are either, in the case of contracts,
“voluntary”—“made by people ‘who are entirely free to act’”78—or, in the case of tort,
imposed as a societal duty.79 The CEO hypothetical, in which the doctor acquired both
“voluntary” and “imposed” duties through the same actions, demonstrates the blurri-
ness of the voluntary-involuntary legal fiction.80
One could also make the argument that, by going out in society, a person im-
pliedly consents—contracts, even—to act in a reasonable manner, as required by tort
law.81 A person who chooses to exercise his autonomy by going out into the world
and interacting with others enters into a “social contract.”82 His “autonomy is
entitled to respect” from others, and likewise, he is also “obligated to respect the
autonomy of other[s].”83 Consequently, when he exercises his freedom in a way that
harms another’s freedom—say, by negligently hitting that other with his car—he is
liable to the other, pursuant to the social contract he entered into.84 This explanation
behind why tort liability exists suggests that all private law includes, in a sense, the
voluntary consent of the parties. The “social contract”85 theory of tort liability further
74 Solove & Richards, supra note 67, at 1670.
75 See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1198–99
(1985).
76 Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
77 See id.
78 Id. at 1199 (citation omitted).
79 See Solove & Richards, supra note 67, at 1666 (explaining that “tort duties . . . apply
against the whole world”).
80 See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
81 See generally Bailey Kuklin, Public Requitals: Corrective, Retributive, and Distributive
Justice, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 245 (2018) (discussing the norms governing society when a per-
son’s “autonomous space” is invaded).
82 Id. at 247.
83 Id. at 246.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 247.
2019] CONTRACTING AWAY THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 549
shows that the voluntary-involuntary distinction between torts and contracts is artificial
and does not provide a satisfactory basis for treating freedom of speech differently
in tort and contract actions.
Courts’ approaches to prior restraints further illustrate the shortcomings of a for-
malistic approach. The Supreme Court has held that, in tort law, “prior restraints . . .
carry ‘a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.’”86 The term “prior
restraints” refers to “administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communi-
cations” issued before those communications occur.87 In tort cases, a plaintiff may
seek an injunction forbidding a defendant from engaging in certain speech—in other
words, the plaintiff may seek a prior restraint.88 But the Court, concerned that im-
portant speech might be silenced, applies strict scrutiny to content-based prior restraints
and lesser scrutiny to content-neutral prior restraints.89
Yet, despite the Court’s concern about prior restraints in the tort context, lower
courts do uphold and enforce private agreements, such as nondisparagement agree-
ments forbidding parties from engaging in certain speech, that are essentially forms
of prior restraint.90 The fact that a prior restraint is invoked through a tort action does
not make a prior restraint invoked in a contract action any different—in both cases,
a potential speaker is silenced.91 While a contract that imposes a prior restraint may
involve the restrained speaker’s consent, the speaker’s earlier consent does not make
that speaker’s potential speech less important.92 The function of the prior restraint
doctrine is to protect important free speech,93 and therefore, given that function,
whether a person once consented not to say something should not affect the applica-
tion of the doctrine.
Furthermore, the fact that the Court has deviated from its typical rigid distinc-
tions suggests those distinctions fail to really protect the constitutional interests at




90 See, e.g., USA Techs., Inc. v. Tirpak, No. 12-2399, 2012 WL 1889157, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
May 24, 2012).
91 See Jacobs, supra note 41, at 951.
92 See id. at 954. Cody Jacobs explains that “‘where matters of purely private significance
are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous’ because such restrictions
pose less of a ‘threat to the free and robust debate of public issues.’” Id. (citation omitted).
However, consenting to speech restriction within the context of a private agreement does not
mean that the speech is more likely to be a matter of “purely private significance.” See id.
Indeed, as shown by the Clifford-Trump NDA, a private agreement may concern speech of
great public significance. See Wilson R. Huhn, The Trump/Clifford Non-Disclosure Agreement:
Violation of Public Policy and the First Amendment, JURIS MAG. (May 13, 2018), http://sites
.law.duq.edu/juris/2018-05/13/the-trump-clifford-non-disclosure-agreement-violation-of-pub
lic-policy-and-the-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/YZZ4-QWPE].
93 See Jacobs, supra note 41, at 954 (stating that the doctrine of prior restraint “has been
called ‘the keystone of First Amendment law’”).
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stake. Shelley is a prime example. The Court’s decision in Shelley suggests that it
realized that adhering to its usual rigid, formalistic distinctions between voluntary,
private contract law and involuntary, public government action would fail to protect
the constitutionally protected priority of equality.94 Specifically, the Court likely rec-
ognized that although the agreement was technically private, it would have poten-
tially significant public effects—for instance, racist white people across the country
might begin to frequently use similar agreements to exclude African Americans.95
Therefore, in order to protect the constitutional interest in equality, the Court departed
from its typical, strict distinction between private agreements and public law.96 While
the Court typically takes a hands-off approach to private agreements, allowing
parties to bargain freely even when constitutional rights are at stake,97 in Shelley the
Court struck down the contract as unconstitutional.98 The Court’s deviation from its
hands-off approach in order to protect constitutional values demonstrates the “inher-
ent weakness of the distinction between public and private action.”99
The Court’s trespass cases100 further show how formalistic distinctions between
causes of action are not only premised upon problematic private-public, voluntary-
involuntary distinctions, but also fail to adequately protect constitutional values. For
example, in Marsh v. Alabama,101 the Court restricted private trespass actions in order
to protect free speech.102 A Jehovah’s Witness had distributed literature on property
owned by a private company without the company’s permission.103 “[D]espite the
[area’s] status as private property,”104 the Jehovah’s Witness’ conduct was protected
because the property owner had opened up his property “for use by the public in gen-
eral.”105 Because the property was generally open to the public, the property essen-
tially functioned as public property, and thus individuals could not be excluded or
punished for their speech.106 To allow so would violate those individuals’ First Amend-
ment rights.107 In so holding, the Court departed from its typical private-public law
94 See Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 470–71 (2007).
95 See id. at 487 (explaining that the Court would likely predict that “[s]uch covenants
could . . . deprive African Americans of the ‘same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . .
to purchase . . . real property’”).
96 See id. at 457–58.
97 See discussion supra Section I.A.
98 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
99 Rosen, supra note 94, at 470.
100 Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
101 Marsh, 326 U.S. 501.
102 Jacobs, supra note 41, at 957.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506).
106 Id. at 958.
107 Id. at 957.
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distinction because, in the Court’s view, that distinction failed to adequately protect
the constitutional right to free speech.108
3. The “Core-Constitutional-Right” Theory Explains the Court’s Intervention
Decisions
The Court’s deviations from traditional distinctions and analysis in cases like
Shelley and Marsh demonstrate the weaknesses of using formalistic distinctions be-
tween causes of action as a means of determining when to intervene in private law
to protect constitutional rights. With formalistic distinctions off the table, what
theory or explanation then explains when the Court should intervene? The “core-
constitutional-right” theory answers how to distinguish when the Court should
intervene in private law other than just through formalistic distinctions between tort,
property, and contract law, or through the “state action” concept.109 Specifically, the
core-constitutional-right theory says that courts should be more willing to intervene
in private law disputes when the private law action threatens the “central purpose”
of a constitutional right.110
This explanation is actually already reflected in the Court’s own treatment of
private law actions. For example, the core-constitutional-right theory explains why
the Court has treated free-speech rights differently in the context of tort actions as
compared to trespass actions.111 The Court protects speech in the context of tort law
by requiring a heightened standard to prove defamation for public officials and
figures.112 In contrast, in the context of property law the Court “has moved away”
from using the First Amendment to limit the ability to use trespass actions to remove
speakers from property.113 The distinction makes sense when viewed through the lens
of the core-constitutional-right theory: “In defamation actions, the court specifically
adjudicates whether the content of speech is liability-triggering, whereas in trespass
actions, the court simply adjudicates where the speaker was located in order to
determine liability.”114 In other words, defamation cases have the potential to require
courts to punish speech based on its content—when the ability to speak one’s mind is
typically strongly protected by the First Amendment.115 On the other hand, trespass
108 See id. (“The Court held that, despite the town’s status as private property, the defendant’s
conduct was nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.”) The Court eventually decided not
to place constitutional limits on private property owners’ ability to restrict, through trespass ac-
tions, what messages individuals express on their property. See discussion infra Section II.A.3.
109 Jacobs, supra note 41, at 968–76 (discussing how the “core right theory” works, as well
as addressing some limitations and critiques).
110 Id. at 969.
111 Id. at 969–70.
112 See, e.g., id. at 949–50.
113 Id. at 969–70.
114 Id. at 970.
115 See id.
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actions are “more analogous to ‘time, place, and manner’ restrictions on free speech.”116
And while the First Amendment strongly protects your ability to say what you want,
it does not as strongly protect your ability to say it whenever and wherever you want.117
In other words, the Court treats defamation differently from trespass because defama-
tion cases have greater implications for core aspects of the First Amendment.118
Speech about public officials and figures is the “core right” protected by the
First Amendment.119 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court stated that the core
of the First Amendment is the protection of speech about “public issues.”120 In fact,
that speech is so important that it is “a fundamental principle of the American gov-
ernment,” “essential to the security of the Republic”—not merely a protected privilege,
but actually a “political duty” of Americans.121 Ultimately the Court held that in order
to protect the First Amendment’s core, public officials had to prove “actual malice”
in order to prevail on a defamation claim, as otherwise core speech about public
issues might be chilled.122
The Court reiterated the core importance of speech concerning public issues in
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, stating that “[a]t the heart of the First Amend-
ment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”123 Again, the Court held that the
core importance of speech justified imposing a higher standard on public officials,
this time one seeking to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.124 Furthermore, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court held that the
importance of free discussion of issues of public concern also justified imposing a
higher standard on public figures for proving libel.125
Not only does the First Amendment protect the individual right to speak, the core
of which is speech about public issues concerning public and political figures, the
Amendment also protects the public’s right to know and receive information about
matters of public concern.126 The right, implicit in the right to speak, stretches back
to Meyer v. Nebraska,127 and has been upheld across a variety of contexts—even
116 Id.
117 See id. at 969–70.
118 See id. at 969.
119 See id.
120 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
121 Id. at 269–70.
122 See id. at 283.
123 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
124 See id. at 56.
125 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967) (stating specifically that the public figure must show “highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers”).
126 See Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right
to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 142 (2003).
127 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a statute prohibiting teaching a foreign language
to children who had not completed eighth grade).
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when the receivers are prisoners or students or the speech was mere commercial
speech128—demonstrating the importance of receiving information to making the right
to speak meaningful. In fact, the Court even stated in Bartnicki v. Vopper that laws
that restrict public access to information “implicate[ ] the core purposes of the First
Amendment.”129 The public’s interest in access to information about public issues
makes speech concerning such issues doubly sacred under the First Amendment.130
The core-constitutional-right theory suggests that, just as the Court has intervened
in private law, such as in tort actions, to protect core free speech rights, courts should
intervene in some nondisclosure agreements because nondisclosure agreements have
the potential to implicate the very heart of the First Amendment. Take, for example, the
alleged nondisclosure agreement between President Trump and Stormy Daniels.131
Daniels’s prohibited speech directly relates to matters of public concern—the conduct
of our nation’s president, this country’s top public official.132 Indeed, if—as the Court
has stated—speech “that is critical of those who hold public office” is the core of what
the First Amendment protects,133 it is hard to imagine a nondisclosure agreement that
better exemplifies an agreement that restricts the core of fundamental speech.134 There-
fore, the Court ought to more closely scrutinize agreements that touch upon such vital
speech, rather than simply dismissing such scrutiny on freedom of contract grounds.
The core-constitutional-right theory necessarily requires courts to make value
judgments about what constitutes a core constitutional right and when to intervene
to protect such a right.135 While such value judgments might seem “off-putting,”
making judgments about the core of constitutional rights has long been a part of
constitutional jurisprudence.136 Indeed, as discussed earlier, the Court’s deviations
from formal distinctions between causes of actions, such as Shelley, and creation of
special doctrines to protect speech, such as the actual malice test for defamation
claims, suggest that consideration of how to protect core constitutional rights has
always been the real driving force behind the Court’s decisions.137
Furthermore, precedent reveals that what constitutes the core right of free speech
is firmly settled: “At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the
fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public
128 See Easton, supra note 126, at 144, 153.
129 532 U.S. 514, 533–34 (2001).
130 See, e.g., Easton, supra note 126, at 165.
131 See Huhn, supra note 92.
132 See Miles Parks, Stormy Daniels Shares Graphic Details About Alleged Affair with
President Trump, NPR (Mar. 26, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/25/5968683
54/stormy-daniels-shares-graphic-details-about-alleged-affair-with-trump [https://perma.cc
/W8QX-2B8D].
133 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988).
134 See Huhn, supra note 92.
135 See Jacobs, supra note 41, at 968–69.
136 Id.
137 See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
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interest and concern.”138 The Court’s defamation decisions further show that speech
about public officials and figures constitutes speech about matters of public interest and
concern.139 The Court’s settled definition of what constitutes the core of free
speech—speech about public issues, officials, and figures—means that courts’ value
judgments as to what constitutes core speech is limited today. Therefore, applying
the constitutional right theory to justify court intervention in nondisclosure agree-
ments does not mean that courts are suddenly going to go wild with unbounded
discretion. Rather, court intervention to protect the speech about public officials and
figures implicated in some nondisclosure agreements represents a consistent applica-
tion of the Court’s previously established definition of, and protection of, core
constitutional speech.
4. Court Intervention in NDAs Is in Line with Traditional Public Policy Intervention
“[T]raditional common law contract doctrine permits courts to refuse to enforce
a fully bargained and otherwise valid agreement if enforcement would violate public
policy.”140 An agreement that is contrary to public policy commonly involves “at-
tempted bargaining around some preordained assignment of rights provided by
common law, statutory, or constitutional rules.”141 For example, courts will not enforce
a liquidated damages clause that imposes a penalty for nonperformance of the contract
because such clauses are against public policy.142 Courts will refuse to enforce liqui-
dated damages clauses regardless of how much “bargaining, notice, or consent” the
parties engaged in as the parties cannot waive or bargain around public policy rules.143
Refusing to enforce nondisclosure agreements on First Amendment grounds fits
neatly into courts’ long-established public policy interventions. Indeed, “Confiden-
tiality agreements are no different than other contracts in that they may be held to be
unenforceable as contrary to public policy. The difficulty is in determining public pol-
icy.”144 Intervening in nondisclosure agreements on First Amendment grounds would
just be another way to protect important public policies, rather than a radical departure
from traditional contract law.145 As mentioned, judges sometimes refuse to enforce
agreements that attempt to skirt “common law, statutory, or constitutional rules” on
public policy grounds.146 Judges should likewise also consider First Amendment
implications in contracts that touch upon free speech, rather than automatically
138 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 50; Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
140 Shell, supra note 7, at 437 n.21.
141 Id. at 443.
142 Id. at 444.
143 Id.
144 Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?,
25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 704–05 (1999) (citation omitted).
145 See Garfield, supra note 37, at 266.
146 See Shell, supra note 7, at 441 (emphasis added).
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upholding them based on freedom to contract; such consideration of constitutional
implications is a natural extension of ordinary public policy rules.147
Furthermore, “public policies vary over time. As the interests of society change,
courts are called upon to recognize new policies.”148 Courts take into account the
strength of the public policy weighed against enforcement, as well as the seriousness
of the misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliberate.149 Addition-
ally, in determining whether public policy requires courts to refuse to enforce an
agreement, judges draw “not only on constitutions, statutes, and case precedent, but
also on their own views of what the public interest or morality requires.”150 Today, the
interests of society suggest that courts should pay more attention to the First Amend-
ment implications of nondisclosure agreements and act to protect threatened First
Amendment rights.
For example, modern government officials have made unprecedented use of
nondisclosure agreements in an attempt to shield those officials from disparagement.151
Specifically, during his campaign, then-Candidate Trump required his campaign
workers to sign nondisclosure agreements binding in perpetuity.152 Once President
Trump gained office, his administration reportedly tried to get his staff to sign similar
agreements.153 Furthermore, President Trump has made several nondisclosure agree-
ments with women prohibiting them from speaking about affairs.154 The President’s use
of these agreements amounts to attempts to prevent the disclosure of information that
might be extremely important for voters.155 Recognizing that the novel use of nondis-
closure agreements by public officials today threatens the public’s interest in free access
to information on issues and officials of public concern, courts should intervene in
nondisclosure agreements that prohibit such speech on public policy grounds.
147 See Garfield, supra note 37, at 267.
148 Shell, supra note 7, at 446.
149 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
150 Shell, supra note 7, at 442 (emphasis added).
151 See, e.g., Josh Dawsey & Ashley Parker, ‘Everyone Signed One’: Trump Aggressive in
Use of Nondisclosure Agreements, Even in Government, SFGATE (Aug. 13, 2018, 6:00 PM),
https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Everyone-signed-one-Trump-aggressive-in-use-of-131
53629.php [https://perma.cc/7DLT-7R8T]; Nondisclosure Agreements Are Rare in Govern-
ment. Here’s Why, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 14, 2018, 6:35 PM), https://www.pbs.org/news
hour/show/nondisclosure-agreements-are-rare-in-government-heres-why [https://perma.cc
/N7F5-W5AG] [hereinafter Nondisclosure Agreements] (“The courts have made it very clear
over the last four decades that there is no legitimate interest in the government in prohibiting
unclassified information from being disseminated. So, what the Trump administration did in
bringing its corporate mentality, they’ve tried in some cases, apparently succeeded, in getting
people to sign non-disclosure agreements.”).
152 Nondisclosure Agreements, supra note 151.
153 Id.
154 See Parks, supra note 132.
155 See Trump’s Alleged Affairs and GOP Voters, NPR (Mar. 28, 2018, 5:03 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2018/03/28/597541676/trumps-alleged-affairs-and-gop-voters [https://perma.cc
/3EEK-LU8U].
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In addition, recent revelations about the sheer extent of sexual mistreatment in
the workplace (and the “elaborate cover up systems,” namely nondisclosure agree-
ments used to protect harassers from scrutiny) also suggest courts should recognize
a new public policy limiting the use of nondisclosure agreements.156 Nondisclosure
agreements made to shield harassers not only enable harmful workplace behavior,
but also affect lawyers’ abilities to corroborate their clients’ cases and thus find
justice for victims of sexual mistreatment.157 Plus, nondisclosure agreements made
to protect harassers are often one-sided, prohibiting only the complainant or victim
from speaking and not the harasser.158 This lopsided balance of power further harms
victims while enabling harassers.159 In sum, the misuse of nondisclosure agreements
to protect harassers demonstrates that those agreements have real implications for
the public interest, indicating that courts should seriously consider intervening in
such agreements on public policy grounds.
5. The Court Has Had Different Approaches to Contract Law Throughout
History160—Showing that There Is Not One Single, “Correct” Way to
Handle Contracts
The Court’s approach to contracts has changed dramatically over time.161 During
the Lochner era, from 1910–1937, the Court “constitutionalized freedom of contract
through the doctrine of economic substantive due process.”162 The era was the height
of freedom of contract, as the Court struck down “both state and federal economic
and labor legislation” that interfered with parties’ abilities to make contracts “on due
process grounds.”163 Yet, even in the notorious Lochner era, the Court still inter-
vened in private contracts on public policy grounds—from “fee-sharing contracts
between attorneys in bankruptcy proceedings,” to “contracts for legislative lobbying
services.”164 The Court dramatically shifted its approach in the Warren era of the
1950s and 60s.165 Because of political pressure due to the Great Depression, the
Court overruled Lochner in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,166 thus opening the way
for “highly deferential review of economic and contractual regulations.”167
156 See Ann Fromholz & Jeanette Laba, #MeToo Challenges Confidentiality and Nondis-
closure Agreements, L.A. LAW., May 2018, at 12.
157 See id. at 13.
158 Id. at 12.
159 See id. at 14.
160 Shell, supra note 7, at 438–39.
161 See id. at 451.
162 Id. at 447.
163 Id. at 448.
164 Id. at 449.
165 Id.
166 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
167 Shell, supra note 7, at 450.
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Today, “the modern Court has made a sharp break with the past and elevated
contract enforcement to the position of a preferred value in its jurisprudential order.”168
In other words, the Court is more contract-friendly, rejecting “the notion that public
policy defenses may be based on judicial preferences of any kind, moral or otherwise”
and allowing parties to waive constitutional rights more freely than any prior period.169
Two important points emerge from the historical evolution of the Court’s approach
to contract law. First, the variation in the Court’s approaches over time refutes the
idea that there is only one correct way to approach contract law.170 Rather, the current
infatuation with freedom of contract may reflect more the current ideology of Supreme
Court justices and legal academics than the ultimate solution and approach for dealing
with contracts.171 Second, the historical variation demonstrates how doctrines and
analysis change to fit the times.172 For example, because of the intense pressures of the
Great Depression, in West Coast Hotel, the Court abandoned its due process protection
for contractual freedom, instead deferring to government legislation regulating busi-
ness and contract.173 Searching judicial scrutiny of government legislation intended
to resolve the Great Depression could hamstring the government’s efforts; thus, the
Court recognized that doctrine needed to change to make way for solutions to the
challenges facing society at the time.174 Likewise, the Court should now recognize
that the emerging threats to free speech and safe workplaces posed by prevalent use
of nondisclosure agreements calls for a new approach to contract law.175
6. The Interests in Favor of Intervention in Nondisclosure Agreements Outweigh
Those in Favor of Nonintervention
The nondisclosure agreements that this Note is concerned with are, as discussed,
those that threaten the public’s access to important speech about public figures and
cover up and enable misconduct.176 Such nondisclosure agreements, like those
concerning sexual affairs and sexual abuse allegations, are made for one purpose:
to cover up one party’s bad conduct so that the party can avoid damage to its
reputation.177 In other words, powerful public figures use nondisclosure agreements
as a tool to prevent speech that damages their reputations—even when that speech
168 Id. at 452.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 433 (“[T]he author finds that the modern Court has shown more fidelity to
an absolute principle of freedom to contract than the Courts that preceded it.”).
172 See id. at 436–37, 447.
173 Id. at 449–50.
174 See id.
175 See discussion supra Section II.A.4.
176 See discussion supra Section II.A.4.
177 See, e.g., Jan Frankel Schau, Where Confidentiality and Transparency Collide: In Sexual
Harassment Cases, Mediators Face a Modern-Day Dilemma, ABA DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Winter 2018, at 6, 7.
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is true and important—without having to satisfy the usual demanding requirements
of the actual malice test.178 Precedent suggests that nondisclosure agreements should
not enable parties to skirt the demands of defamation law in this way and that there-
fore intervention to prevent a loophole in the law is required.
For example, in Cohen, the Court drew attention to the fact that Cohen was not
“attempting to use a promissory estoppel cause of action to avoid the strict requirements
for establishing a libel or defamation claim.”179 In a subsequent case, Compuware
Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs.,180 the Sixth Circuit interpreted the Court’s state-
ment to mean that when a party claims a breach of confidentiality in order to avoid
the requirements of a defamation claim, the actual malice standard does apply.181 In
that case, a company, Compuware, asked Moody’s Investors Services to provide
Compuware with a credit rating.182 However, when Moody’s published its rating for
Compuware, Compuware was not happy with the rating and sued Moody’s for breach
of contract.183 The court, applying Cohen, found that the actual malice standard applied
because the contract involved matters “central to the First Amendment” (e.g., free
speech) and because Compuware complained “only of an injury to its reputation.”184
Therefore, both Compuware and Cohen suggest that when the sole purpose of a
breach of contract claim is to protect the reputation of a public figure or official, the
First Amendment interest in protecting important speech trumps individuals’ repu-
tational interests.185 Thus, intervention to protect free speech is appropriate.
B. How Should the Court Intervene in Nondisclosure Agreements?
1. Which Test?: The “Actual Malice” Test
In tort cases, the Court has held that public officials and figures cannot recover
for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress unless they prove the
defendant had “actual malice.”186 Specifically, the public plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s speech “contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual
malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard
as to whether or not it was true.”187 The Court should apply the actual malice test to
nondisclosure agreements. In other words, a public official or public figure seeking
178 See Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Inv’rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 533 (6th Cir. 2007)
(discussing how a party to a confidentiality agreement uses that agreement solely to skirt the
requirements of defamation law).
179 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991).
180 Compuware, 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007).
181 Id. at 529–31.
182 Id. at 522.
183 Id. at 523–24.
184 Id. at 531–32.
185 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991); Compuware, 499 F.3d at 533.
186 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
187 Id.
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to recover for the breach of a nondisclosure agreement would need to prove the
breacher had actual malice.
2. Which Agreements?
Nondisclosure agreements can, as discussed, be formed for perfectly valid reasons,
such as protecting a victim’s privacy, protecting businesses from vindictive ex-
employees, or protecting trade secrets.188 However, nondisclosure agreements designed
to skirt defamation principles and shield an individual from the consequences of his or
her own bad conduct serve only the individual’s reputational interests.189 Therefore, the
actual malice test should apply to those nondisclosure agreements designed to protect
a public figure’s reputation solely from the negative effects of his or her own conduct.
Courts can determine which nondisclosure agreements are formed for the purpose
of protecting a person’s reputation by asking and analyzing a few questions. First,
what is the information covered under the agreement? If the agreement concerns
information about the conduct of the party claiming a breach, the court can address
the second question. Namely, what effect would disclosure have on the person’s
reputation? Finally, would a reasonable person believe reputational protection was
the sole purpose for the agreement? These questions generally reveal whether the
agreement was made solely to protect an individual’s reputation from damage
caused by his or her own actions; however, courts should be mindful of other asserted
purposes of the agreement. Parties should not be able to weasel their way out of the
actual malice test by asserting sham purposes. An example might be a public figure
who states that his interest in a nondisclosure agreement preventing another from
speaking about an affair or other misconduct is to protect his marriage. Perhaps the
information will affect the figure’s marriage, but that effect will likely be because the
information reflects poorly on the figure—in other words, harms his reputation. Thus,
tentatively, purposes that are ultimately rooted in avoiding negative consequences
caused by a party’s misconduct are sham purposes not entitled to any weight.
Requiring courts to scrutinize agreements and answer these questions may appear
to invoke quite a bit of judicial discretion, and thus, uncertainty as well. However,
courts already invoke judicial discretion in enforcing nondisparagement agreements.190
Nondisparagement agreements require a party, for instance, not to “criticize, ridicule
or make any statement which disparages or is derogatory of the other.”191 Some
parties to nondisparagement agreements accused of violating those agreements argue
that the agreements are too “indefinite” and ambiguous for a court to enforce them.192
188 See discussion supra Section I.C.
189 See discussion supra Section II.A.6.
190 See George L. Blum, Annotation, Non-Disparagement or Gag Clause in Settlement
Agreement, 33 A.L.R. 7th Art. 7, 572–73 (2016).
191 Id. at 572.
192 Bruce A. Wessel, Preliminary Injunctions Enforcing Contractual Nondisparagement
Clauses, 33 COMM. LAW. 20, 25 (2017).
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After all, depending on the context, virtually “anything [one] might say . . . could be
considered disparaging.”193 Nonetheless, despite the open, rather vague language of
nondisparagement agreements, courts have judged which statements are in fact
disparaging.194 In other words, courts have used their discretion to determine the
reputational effect of nondisparagement agreements.
The proposed actual malice test simply asks courts to apply that same discretion
to determine the effect of a breach of a nondisclosure agreement. Does the breach
have a derogatory or disparaging effect on the party’s reputation? Just as parties to
nondisparagement agreements may argue over whether or not speech was actually
disparaging, here the parties may argue about the purposes of the agreement and
effect of the breaching speech; ultimately, however, the decision is left to the court.195
Furthermore, using a judicial determination of the effect of the breaching speech to
decide whether the purpose of the agreement was to protect the party’s identity is
preferable to looking at the party’s stated purpose. A party could easily twist the
purpose of the agreement away from reputational protection and towards something
else. For example, rather than claiming that the nondisclosure agreement with Stormy
Daniels was designed to protect President Trump’s reputation, President Trump
could claim that the agreement was meant to “save [his] marriage.”196 Thus, basing
intervention decisions on parties’ stated purpose(s), while perhaps simpler than the
proposed judicial questions, would allow parties to again skirt the heightened re-
quirements of defamation and other tort claims to suppress important speech.
Furthermore, the actual malice test should not apply to confidentiality agreements
formed during litigation and discovery. Because discovery allows “wide-ranging
inquiry into relevant, non-privileged information,” litigants often “obtain damaging
information about an opposing party” during the course of litigation.197 Accordingly,
litigants often make confidentiality agreements to protect disclosure of damaging or
embarrassing information obtained during litigation.198 The actual malice test should
not apply to such agreements, as they serve a useful role in helping to decrease the costs
and time of litigation. Specifically, such agreements discourage parties from fishing for
information that “has little or no relationship to the merits of the case” because the
confidentiality agreements prevent the parties from revealing that information to use
193 Id.
194 See, e.g., USA Techs., Inc. v. Tirpak, No. 12-2399, 2012 WL 1889157, at *3–4 (E.D.
Pa. May 24, 2012). While the parties disagreed on whether the statements at issue constituted
disparaging remarks, the court decided that they were disparaging because they were “unfa-
vorable remarks and criticisms.” Id.
195 See, e.g., id.
196 Charlie Savage & Kenneth P. Vogel, The Legal Issues Raised by the Stormy Daniels
Payment, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FFPPcS.
197 Dustin B. Benham, Tangled Incentives: Proportionality and the Market for Reputation
Harm, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 427, 428, 431–32 (2018).
198 Id. at 428.
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as leverage against their opponents.199 Therefore, because the routine use of discov-
ery nondisclosure agreements serves the valuable purpose of increasing litigation
efficiency, rather than solely allowing wrongdoers to skirt defamation law, the actual
malice test should not apply.
3. Defining “Public Figure”
There are three types of public figures.200 First, “all-purpose” public figures are
those “who achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety [although that notoriety need not
be nation or statewide] that they become public figures for all purposes and in all con-
texts.”201 Courts may consider evidence such as statistical data on a person’s name
recognition or evidence that others “alter or reevaluate their conduct in light of the
plaintiff’s actions” in determining whether a plaintiff qualifies as an all-purpose public
figure.202 Second, while generally a person must have taken affirmative steps to attract
public attention in order to be a public figure, if a defendant can prove by “clear evi-
dence” that the person has become a “central figure in a significant public controversy,”
and the matter in dispute has arisen in the context of that controversy, then that person
may qualify as an “involuntary public figure.”203 Finally, a person may be a “limited
purpose public figure”—someone who has “voluntarily inject[ed] [his or her self] into
a particular public controversy and thereby become [a] public figure[ ] for a limited
range of issues.”204
To ensure the protection of free speech about important public issues, while at
the same time preventing judicial overreach into private agreements, the actual malice
test should apply only to nondisclosure agreements formed by “all-purpose” and
“involuntary” public figures (in addition to public officials). “All-purpose” and “in-
voluntary” public figures feature in and affect matters of significant, widespread
public interest, thereby posing the risk that the nondisclosure agreements that they
form could suppress very important speech about public issues.205 In contrast, the
limited significance of “limited purpose” public figures means that the nondisclosure
agreements they form are much less likely to suppress information affecting important,
far-reaching public issues.206 As such, the rationale behind applying the actual malice
test to nondisclosure agreements, namely to ensure the public has access to core con-
stitutional speech about public issues, applies much less strongly to nondisclosure
agreements formed by “limited-purpose” public figures. Because the risk that important
information will be suppressed is much lower, and to prevent the risk of too much
199 See id. at 430–31.
200 Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 532 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1118 (2000);
53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 141 (2019).
201 Wells, 186 F.3d at 532.
202 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 141 (2019).
203 Id.
204 Wells, 186 F.3d at 532.
205 See 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 141 (2019).
206 See id.
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judicial interference in private agreements, the actual malice test should not apply
to “limited-purpose” public figure nondisclosure agreements.
C. Why the Actual Malice Test Is the Best Test for Intervention
1. Applying the Test Shows that the Test Protects Core Constitutional Speech
While Still Allowing Nondisclosure Agreements to Perform the Important
Function of Protecting Privacy, Economic Interests, and Freedom of Contract
A court applying the actual malice test to the facts of President Trump’s nondisclo-
sure agreement with Stormy Daniels would not enforce that agreement. As President,
Donald Trump is a public official.207 His status triggers the application of the rest of the
questions of the test208: first, what information is covered under the agreement? The
Trump-Daniels nondisclosure agreement covers information related to the sexual en-
counter the two had—in other words, the agreement covers the conduct of the party
claiming a breach: President Trump.209 Because the agreement covers the conduct of
the aggrieved, public-official party, the court moves on to the next question: what effect
would disclosure have on President Trump’s reputation? Because society generally
disfavors extramarital affairs, disclosure of the covered information could very well
have a negative impact on President Trump’s reputation,210 thereby triggering the final
question: was reputational protection the sole purpose for forming the agreement? A
reasonable person would likely answer in the affirmative; trying to come up with alter-
native purposes served by preventing disclosure of the information yields little fruit.
In contrast, a court applying the actual malice test to the facts of the nondisclosure
agreement at issue in Cohen would enforce that agreement. The individual claiming
breach was Cohen, an employee who worked on a gubernatorial candidate’s cam-
paign.211 Given that gubernatorial candidates may affect state politics, and thus some
range of public issues, Cohen might be characterized as a “limited-purpose” public
figure.212 Even if Cohen did qualify as a “limited-purpose” public figure, however,
the nondisclosure agreement actual malice test only applies to “all-purpose” and
“involuntary public figures.”213 Therefore, a court would decline to even apply the
207 Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Who Is “Public Official” for the Purposes of Defama-
tion Action, 44 A.L.R. 5th 193, 222 (1996) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court in Rosenblatt
v. Baer subsequently held that the ‘public official’ designation applies at the very least to
those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to
have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”
(footnote omitted)).
208 See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
209 See Parks, supra note 132.
210 See Trump’s Alleged Affairs and GOP Voters, supra note 155 (explaining that Trump’s
alleged affairs could impact how voters feel about him).
211 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1991).
212 See 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 141 (2019).
213 See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
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actual malice test to Cohen’s nondisclosure agreement, thus upholding the agreement
and punishing the breaching party.
These applications show that the test achieves its purpose of protecting core
constitutional speech about public issues concerning public officials or figures214
while still being narrow enough to allow nondisclosure agreements to perform the
important functions of protecting privacy, economic interests, and freedom of contract.
Furthermore, another benefit of the actual malice test is that it enables important
public speech to be protected without requiring the court to decide on a case-by-case
basis if the prohibited speech is “core constitutional speech.”215 Such ad hoc evalua-
tions of the nature of the speech could lead to “censorship” and “chill the free exchange
of ideas.”216 Instead, the actual malice test is, in essence, a law of general application:
speech about public officials and certain public figures is core constitutional speech,
regardless of what particular judges may think.
When a court is in doubt as to whether the actual malice standard should prohibit
enforcement of a nondisclosure agreement—as there are sure to be difficult cases,
especially because whether someone qualifies as a “public figure” is not always
clear—courts should fall back on the justifications behind the rule. In other words,
courts should think about the importance of the speech to issues of public concern
(for example, by considering the core-constitutional-right theory, as well as the public
figure’s degree of influence), public policy (for example, does the use of nondisclosure
agreements contribute to public policy issues, such as enabling a culture of sexual
harassment?), and what interests the nondisclosure agreement protects (for example,
is the agreement just made to protect a powerful person’s reputation?).
2. Addressing Potential Criticisms
Critics might be concerned that court intervention in nondisclosure agreements
would invade people’s privacy.217 For instance, by refusing to enforce some nondisclo-
sure agreements on free speech grounds, the Court could enable parties to those
agreements to disclose private information. This concern is certainly valid; indeed, the
Court has recognized that “[p]rivacy of communication is an important interest” that en-
courages “the uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among private parties.”218
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, however, the Court also held that “privacy concerns give way
when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”219
214 See discussion supra Section II.A.3.
215 Cf. Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1207 (2008) (explaining that “speech about public persons must
be both false and insincere . . . before it can be penalized” under the actual malice test).
216 Erik Walker, Comment, Defamation Law: Public Figures—Who Are They?, 45 BAYLOR
L. REV. 955, 959 (1993).
217 See Garfield, supra note 37, at 275.
218 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001).
219 Id. at 534.
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In other words, while privacy is an important interest, the interest in free speech on
matters of public importance may trump privacy concerns.220
Specifically, the Court in Vopper held that whether free speech interests trump
privacy concerns is a decision that must be made in the “context of the instant case.”221
For instance, in the context of Vopper, a case in which a statute made the disclosure
of illegally intercepted communications a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment,
free speech interests outweighed privacy interests.222 The illegally intercepted speech
in the case concerned a teachers’ union’s negotiations with a school, which the
Court stated was a matter of “public importance.”223 Because the speech concerned
a matter of public importance, the statute’s interest in protecting privacy was not
sufficient to justify its punishment of the intercepted speech.224
Compared to the context of Vopper, the context and specifics of the nondisclo-
sure agreements this Note addresses suggest that the privacy concerns are out-
weighed by the free speech interests implicated by these agreements. The Court in
Vopper held that the speech concerned matters of important public interest, even
though that speech only concerned a union’s bargaining with a single high school.225
Here, the nondisclosure agreements concern speech that has significance for the
entire nation—in the case of President Trump’s agreement, speech about the conduct
of our nation’s Chief Executive,226 and in the case of the Catholic Church’s non-
disclosure agreements, speech about a religious institution that has members across
the nation.227 Therefore, if the speech about a single high school in Bartnicki was
important and public enough to topple privacy concerns,228 the speech in the nondis-
closure agreements here is surely important enough to justify privacy intrusions.
Therefore, while staunch supporters of privacy may not be pleased, the Court’s
own precedent suggests that the free speech enabled by not enforcing certain non-
disclosure agreements warrants invading privacy. That being said, the proposed actual
malice test does not necessarily open the door to all kind of privacy intrusions. For
instance, because the actual malice test only applies to public officials and figures,
“disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip and other matters of purely private
concern” would continue to be protected by nondisclosure agreements.229 Furthermore,
the narrowness of the proposed test also ensures that the vast majority of nondisclosure
agreements would remain intact. The test only applies to public officials and figures
220 Id.
221 Id. at 529 (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532–33).
222 Id. at 534.
223 Id. at 518, 534.
224 Id. at 534.
225 Id. at 518.
226 See Parks, supra note 132.
227 See Ryan M. Philp, Silence at Our Expense: Balancing Safety and Secrecy in Non-
Disclosure Agreements, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 845, 845–47 (2003).
228 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535.
229 Id. at 533.
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who have formed nondisclosure agreements solely to protect their reputations from
their own damning conduct—in other words, those who have formed nondisclosure
agreements to skirt defamation law’s heightened requirements for public officials
and figures.230 Additionally, because determining who qualifies as a public official
or figure is sometimes difficult, judges should be conservative, only administering
the actual malice test when it is clear that a party to the nondisclosure agreement is
a public official or “all-purpose” or “involuntary” public figure.231 The narrowness
of the proposed test, as well as judicial conservatism, mean that the information of
private persons and businesses trying to protect trade secrets—really anyone other
than a public figure or official trying to shield his or her reputation from disparage-
ment—will be protected by their nondisclosure agreements.
Critics might argue that the use of the actual malice test will allow courts to impose
their personal value judgments—their discretion—on private agreements. However,
those critics should keep in mind the reality that some degree of judicial discretion is
an “inescapable aspect of legal decision-making.”232 Indeed, the hands-off approach,
the currently popular conception of contract law, itself reflects judicial values and
opinions—specifically, the opinion that the value of complete freedom of contract
should guide the judicial approach to contracts as much as possible. But is the value of
complete freedom of contract really better than the value of protecting free speech?
Furthermore, while court intervention in nondisclosure agreements may be more
difficult, requiring more complex judgments and analysis by courts rather than a simple
rule upholding all voluntarily formed private agreements. The easiest path is not always
the best path: “[j]ust because public policy is difficult to determine does not mean
that the quest should be abandoned.”233 Also, the actual malice test really does not
allow for much judicial discretion.234 A court need only decide whether the person
is a public official or figure, and there are clear definitions from precedent guiding
230 See discussion supra Section II.A.6.
231 See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
232 See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561,
1562 (2003); see also Keith Hawkins, The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law
and Social Science, in THE USES OF DISCRETION 11, 13 (1992) (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992)
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making sense of rules, and in making choices about the relevance and use of rules.”).
233 Bast, supra note 144, at 705.
234 See Susan M. Gilles, Public Plaintiffs and Private Facts: Should the “Public Figure”
Doctrine Be Transplanted into Privacy Law?, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1204, 1233 (2005) (“The Court
also offered a second reason for the adoption of the public figure test: it avoided the need for
case-by-case balancing, and instead offered a definitional balancing approach. As the Court
put it: ‘Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each particular case
is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general application.’ Thus in libel law, the
public figure doctrine requires the Court to determine to which category a plaintiff belongs,
and thereby, what level of fault the plaintiff must prove. It does not call for an individualized,
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that determination.235 The determination then requires the court to answer a few
more, relatively simple questions.236 In a sense, the actual malice test is quite similar
to the hands-off approach to contracts: its initial adoption reflects a certain judicial
preference or value, but once the approach is adopted, there’s little room for judicial
discretion.
Furthermore, even if the actual malice test is a discretionary standard,237 there
are benefits to discretion. Judicial discretion can repair gaps and loopholes in the
law. For example, the prevalent use of nondisclosure agreements to suppress evidence
of sexual harassment in the workforce suggests the current hands-off approach to
contract law allows for suppression of important speech.238 “Discretion can let the
decision-maker do justice”239 by filling in this dangerous loophole. In fact, legisla-
tures and courts sometimes purposely create discretionary rules and standards in
recognition that “cases will arise in circumstances so varied, so complex, and so un-
predictable that satisfactory rules that will accurately guide decision-makers to correct
results in a sufficiently large number of cases cannot be written.”240 In other words,
discretion is not necessarily the enemy—in fact, discretion may be an important solu-
tion to legal problems and loopholes. Certainly a blind preference for upholding
private agreements is potentially worse than some thoughtful discretion!
Proponents of judicial efficiency may also find fault with the proposed actual
malice test. A hands-off approach to contracts is, theoretically, simple—when a
contract is breached, the breacher pays, period. Judicial intervention could potentially
drag out contract litigation, leading to more cases and more expenses for plaintiffs
and defendants.241 However, such a view is overly simplistic and does not necessarily
reflect reality. For instance, take the nondisclosure agreement between Stormy Daniels
and President Trump. Daniels sued Trump in 2018, seeking a declaration that their
agreement was void.242 Specifically, Daniels argued that no agreement had been formed
because Trump did not consent to the agreement and the proposed agreement had an
235 See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
236 See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
237 But see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. Gertz suggests that the Supreme Court does not think
the actual malice test is actually a discretionary standard. In that case, the Court reaffirmed
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it would require judges to “decide on an ad hoc basis” what constitutes a public interest. Id.
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traditional public figure test is not discretionary. Id.
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illegal purpose.243 Daniels also demanded a jury trial.244 In short, Daniels’s suit demon-
strates that breaches of nondisclosure agreements are not always simple and efficient
affairs. Indeed, parties whose breaches expose them to substantial financial loss—in
Daniels’ case, as much as one million dollars per breach245—are likely to fight the
agreement any way they can. If a First Amendment defense is unavailable, parties
like Daniels will be able to find other legal theories to contest enforcement of the
nondisclosure agreement. In fact, perhaps the actual malice test could make non-
disclosure agreement proceedings more efficient. A court could first determine whether
the actual malice test would preclude enforcement of a valid agreement. If so, the
court has no need to address whether there was in fact an agreement or whether it
was void on other grounds.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed course. From the Court’s varied
approaches to contract law in the Lochner and Warren eras, to the Court’s unique
stances in Shelley and Marsh, the Court’s perspectives on contracts and free speech
have evolved as society has changed.246 Specifically, the Court has acted to achieve
a balance between private freedom and protecting constitutional interests. Accord-
ingly, the Court should now change its approach to nondisclosure agreements. While
the Court typically takes a “hands-off” approach to private agreements, in today’s
age, such an approach significantly threatens access to extremely important speech.
Powerfully situated wrongdoers are increasingly using nondisclosure agreements to
protect their reputations from their own misconduct and exploiting a loophole in
defamation law. Nondisclosure agreements may serve important purposes, from
protecting privacy to protecting trade secrets, but their abuse robs society of speech
about important public concerns—speech that, according to the Court, forms the
very core of the First Amendment. Therefore, the Court should require a public
figure who seeks to recover for a breach of a nondisclosure agreement formed solely
to protect the figure’s reputation from his own misconduct to satisfy the actual
malice test. Applying the actual malice test will bring needed consistency to the
Court’s approach to actions seeking to recover for disparaging speech, maintain
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